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Theme1: The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brings a number of institutional 
innovations. The Treaty includes a number of modalities of differentiated integration which 
did already exist and it adds some new forms. 
 
 
Summary: The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brings a number of institutional 
innovations. Among these, the Treaty includes a number of modalities of differentiated 
integration which did already exist (such as enhanced cooperation or opt-outs) and it adds 
some new forms: ‘oriented’ enhanced cooperation; opt-ins and permanent structured 
cooperation on defence. Given the subsidiary character that these forms have vis-à-vis 
the standard Community methods (all states through the same legal instruments), the Trio 
cannot anticipate an agenda of application for any of them. Nevertheless, some issues 
may crop up in the agenda that require action by means of these instruments. 
 
 
 
Analysis: The term differentiated integration refers to a variety of forms of cooperation 
and / or integration in which not all members of the EU take part, and which therefore do 
not have uniform legal and political effects for all of them. All of these modalities owe their 
existence to the answers they provide to this question: how can one move forward if there 
are countries which can and want to do so but there are others who do not want to or 
cannot? Flexibility is the operating principle that allows the EU to conceive of and put into 
practice methods of differentiated integration, as opposed to institutional, procedural and 
formal ‘rigidity’ that implies exclusive application of the EU system in all cases and for all 
countries.  
 
Debate on differentiated integration and flexibility intensified with the failure of the EU 
Constitution and the troubles the bloc faced in getting the Lisbon Treaty ratified. This is 
not a new issue, however. In fact, proposals for and discussion of differentiated 
integration go back to the 1970s, to the time Britain joined the EU, and since then they 
have been a fixture, updated depending on the circumstances.  
 
In the current context, there are essentially two circumstances that raise interest in this 
issue. On one hand, the size of the EU (27 members and rising) introduces a growing  
 ‘heterogeneity’ (size, per capita income, geopolitical orientation, etc.) that causes 
European leaders and commentators to wonder if, at times, some of these member states 
have the will and / or ability to move forward in some policies and even with the process of 
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integration in general (that is to say, if they really want to accept EU policies across the 
board and have the means to do so). Along with this traditional question, a non-inclusive 
idea is being hinted at more and more openly: that one group of states might want to 
provide themselves with a public good from which the rest is excluded.  
 
Meanwhile, this growing heterogeneity among states coincides with a greater ‘internal 
diversity’ in political options regarding the EU. In some of the older member states, the 
existence of Eurosceptic parties, groups or tendencies has been constant; such is the 
case of Britain or France (where part of the left or right have at several times objected to 
the EU project). Joining them are some of the new states that became members in 2004, 
such as the Czech Republic (where Vaclav Klaus voices strong criticism of the EU), 
Poland (where conservative parties hold a reactionary vision of the EU) and even new 
anti-EU splinter groups in traditionally pro-European countries such as the Netherlands 
and even Italy. Indeed, there is a greater internal plurality that also means the absence of 
national consensuses on the EU and its integration project.  
 
Theoretical conceptual schemes for differentiated integration  
 
The theoretical schemes that have been presented over the years tend to be rather 
ambiguous approaches which often overlap and have little ability (beyond visual images) 
to get to the heart of the real problems involved in differentiated integration. As they are 
mixtures in this sort of discourse, a brief description of the concepts most often used is 
useful.  
 
• Core (vanguard): this notion means that a group of countries take part in all 
possible schemes and modalities of integration and / or cooperation, in such a way 
that they automatically define the centre of gravity around which policy in Europe 
pivots. The idea of a ‘vanguard’ or ‘pioneering group’ is halfway between the ‘hard 
core’ (static) and the ‘multi-speed Europe:’ the vanguard seeks to open up a path 
that other countries will follow later.  
• Concentric circles: this concept was more in fashion in the 1980s and 90s, and 
has since fallen into disuse. Although it is applied both to the EU and its 
relationship with its surroundings, it actually serves more to relate the various 
international European organisations with the idea of integration. Starting off from 
a central core, cooperation and integration among states would be organised 
through different bodies, the greater or lesser intensity of which would generate 
circles around this central point. The circles would essentially define areas of 
cooperation and / or integration and their legal-political intensity (EU / European 
Economic area / Council of Europe / Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe).  
• Directory: more than an academic approach, this is an idea that is occasionally 
raised in political circles and involves (unlike the more neutral concept of a central 
core) a conscious will to direct, guide or influence policy in Europe and the EU. 
Obviously, it is not a ‘formalised’ concept stemming from an organisational or 
institutional model.  
• Variable geometry: this is a descriptive model of the system in which, within a 
common integration scheme, different groups of states participate in different 
policies.  
• Multi-speed Europe: unlike the previous concept, all states would take part in all 
EU policies, also within a common integration scheme, but would embrace these 
policies at different times, depending on their ability to implement them.  
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 Europe à la carte: the areas of specific policies and ways of cooperation / 
integration are presented as if on a restaurant menu, from which countries can 
choose at will, depending on their interests.   
 •In relation with the previous concept, the idea of selective or differential 
membership is being increasingly used in order to describe the United Kingdom’s 
position within the EU (because of its selective repeal of parts of the EU acquis), 
but also as a possible model for incorporating Turkey, for instance. Here, it should 
be mentioned that Norway has adopted much of the EU acquis without being a 
member.  
 
Existing modalities  
 
Of course, the existing models of differentiated integration have not followed these 
theoretical models, but rather have responded to the need to provide ad hoc solutions to 
the specific demands of certain states in given circumstances. Formulas for differentiated 
integration were incorporated for the first time into the Single European act and have been 
retained, in their different variations, up to and including the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Voluntary exclusion (opt-out)  
The opt-out is characterised by the following features. In the first place, it is defined under 
primary law (normally, through protocols) which, furthermore, spells out specifically which 
states accept this voluntary exclusion (in other words, it is not a generic option that is 
open to each and ever y state at all times). Also, the opt-out is applied to issues and areas 
that are clearly defined (it is not something that is available for any EU policy). Strictly 
speaking, the first case was Britain’s opt-out from the European social charter adopted as 
a protocol to the Single European act. The best known case, however, was the British and 
Danish opt-out from the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union (Sweden, which in 
a referendum rejected joining EMU, has no de jure opt out, although it does have a de 
facto one). Curiously, article 139 of the current Lisbon Treaty refers to states which have 
not fulfiled the criteria for advancing to the third phase of EMU as “member states with 
derogation”. Opt-outs have gone from the monetary realm to the Schengen acquis (once it 
was incorporated into the Treaty), from which the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
are excluded.  
 
Finally, the last case of an opt-out came with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
was incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty with a protocol. The United Kingdom and Poland 
have excluded themselves partially (the Czech President Klaus has demanded similar 
treatment for his own country).  
 
Opt-outs have traditionally been viewed with wariness, the idea being that they undermine 
the EU integration model. But the cases mentioned earlier show the positive side: opt-outs 
allow integration to be applied to a sector without depending on the will of those who 
exclude themselves. Furthermore, such countries are the ones who assume the cost of 
their own exclusion (although Britain’s opt-out from the social charter did involve a lot a 
free-riding on the higher social standards that the charter introduced for other member 
states. Nevertheless, the UK did finally renounce its opt-out).  
Enhanced cooperation  
 
Unlike opt-outs, enhanced cooperation is a mechanism for affirming a will to advance and 
by definition it refers only to participating states. Primary law defines a framework but 
does not identify a priori the areas for specific application (although those in which it can 
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be applied are identified: they are non-exclusive areas of jurisdiction which do not affect 
the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion) nor the specific countries 
which participate and which are excluded a priori. On the other hand, the pre-requisites 
for activating this policy are spelled out: there have to be at least nine member states 
interested (it was eight under the Nice Treaty), it must be open to including new 
participants, although “conditions of participation” can be established (articles 328.1; 
333.1 of the Lisbon Treaty). 
 
In the first place, the Treaty defines the ‘situation’ in which enhanced cooperation can be 
activated (as a last resort, once it has been confirmed that agreeing on ordinary EU rules 
is impossible) and also the ‘procedure’ for doing so: the initiative affects the relevant 
states, and the proposal is to come from the European Commission or the High 
Representative if it is a question of foreign and security policy. The final decision is 
adopted by the Council by a qualified majority (or unanimity in the case of foreign and 
security policy) and the European Parliament must grant its consent (in the case of foreign 
and security policy, the Parliament will only be informed).  
 
Enhanced cooperation has drawn attention because it brings together the appeal of 
‘cartesian’ models favoured by academics with its concrete legal existence. However, its 
greatest defect is the scant operational effectiveness it has shown since being created in 
the Amsterdam Treaty (1996). So far only one case of ‘enhanced cooperation’ has been 
implemented: the European norm that allows couples from different member states to 
choose which national jurisdiction will apply in divorce cases (the participating states are 
Spain, France, Italy, Romania, Luxembourg, Greece, Austria, Hungary and Slovenia). 
Aside from whether it is actually used or not, some commentators say that the value of 
enhanced cooperation lies more in its value as a threat to get a particular measure 
approved through regular EU channels. 
 
“Oriented” enhanced cooperation…  
This is a variation of the previous concept, applicable to certain realms defined a priori 
within the area of freedom, security and justice: under the Lisbon Treaty, mutual 
recognition of sentences, judicial and cross-border police cooperation (82.3), the creation 
of a European Public Prosecutor’s office (86.1), and judicial cooperation (87.3). The most 
notable innovation is that its activation is almost automatic if the ordinary legislative 
procedure fails; only a unanimous ‘no’ vote from the European Council can block its 
implementation (the so-called ‘accelerator’). This automatic mechanism is the biggest 
advantage of a system designed with the goal of overcoming the prospect of a British 
veto.   
 
…and its corollary, discretionary participation (opt-in)  
The aforementioned modality is pre-configured to anticipate a British (and possibly Irish) 
opt-out. It carries with it the possibility of Britain deciding in a discretionary fashion if it 
wants to take part in those areas in which it has previously stated it wants an opt-out (sic) 
(Protocol 22 of the Lisbon Treaty). In the past, member states of the EU adopted two 
Regulations (establishing the Frontex agency and regulating the anthropomorphic data to 
be included in databases on electronic passports) and the United Kingdom appealed both 
before the European Court of Justice on grounds that it had been illegally excluded! The 
Court wisely rejected both lawsuits (sentences C-77/05 and C-137/05).   
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Permanent structured cooperation  
Applying enhanced cooperation to the area of defence (permanent structured 
cooperation) involves some differences compared to enhanced cooperation in foreign and 
security policy. Fundamentally, decisions can be adopted by a qualified majority, and 
participation requires the reaching of more binding commitments to carry out more 
demanding missions and the fulfilment of higher-level military capability criteria. The 
French government has already presented a proposal to begin articulating permanent 
structured cooperation.  
 
Besides this, in the area of defence there are modalities which, without being forms of 
structured cooperation in the strict sense, nevertheless apply the principle of flexibility. 
Thus, the Lisbon Treaty allows for member states to organise cooperation and 
coordination among their administrations responsible for national security (art. 73); for the 
European Defence agency (art. 45.2), in which any member state which wishes can 
participate (in actual fact, all do except for Denmark); and to organise missions outside 
the EU to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and boost international security – this can be 
assigned to groups of countries (art. 42). However, it should not be forgotten that there is 
flexibility within the structure of security policy. Thus, a joint action within the framework of 
security and defence in which only some EU countries take part is what gave rise to the 
EU mission in waters off Somalia to prevent piracy (EU NaVFOR Somalia). 
 
Parallel functional integration  
The choice of the term ‘functional’ is not arbitrary. In the 1950s, the functionalist 
theoreticians of integration (Mitrany, etc.) embraced the principle that form (legal and 
political) would flow from the function that was sought and the top priority was in fact to 
define these functions and tasks. Thus, this modality involves creating schemes, which 
are parallel and concurrent with the goals of the EU, with participation by a number of 
members smaller than the total in the EU and which do not adopt its institutional model or 
its regulator y model. There are many examples, from the oldest ones (the Western 
European Union, finally absorbed by the EU itself ) to the most current ones, such as the 
Prüm Convention (2005) and the European Space agency (1975), the Schengen 
agreement (1985) or the Eurocorps (1992). 
 
Pros and cons of differentiated integration  
 
After this descriptive summary, it is a good idea to evaluate differentiated integration as a 
whole, albeit briefly. The disadvantages it entails can be summarised in the following:  
Potential for reversing integration  
 
Most advocates of orthodox EU thought systematically conclude their analysis by saying 
that differentiated integration modes can undermine what has already been achieved and 
block further progress. But this argument is inaccurate because differentiated integration 
proposals have emerged rather as a reaction to the lack of drive toward integration on the 
part of the EU as a whole. The idea that there are integration-curbing mechanisms in 
these modalities is correct only if one contrasts integration with differentiated integration. 
However, the comparison is incorrect. 
 
Rupture of legal unity within the EU 
This argument is constructed in a parallel fashion to the previous one, and stresses the 
application of some EU norms only in some countries and to some EU citizens. At tactical 
level, there is no denying this. But if we are realistic, it should be viewed as a problem 
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only in certain circumstances: if discrimination and / or legal insecurity arise. Without 
downplaying this possibility, it does seem clear that the existing modalities of 
differentiated integration discussed earlier have not caused major problems in this regard.  
 
Encouraging free-riding  
Perhaps the most solid objection refers to the possibility of free-riding: obtaining benefits 
from differentiated integration without assuming the costs of taking part in it. Some of the 
existing examples, namely EMU, show that these schemes actually externalise (transfer 
to countries not included) some of their costs (as seen in the lack of autonomous 
monetary policy of those which are excluded). Looking to the future, defence is often cited 
as an area in which free-riding will be inevitable. However, this argument can be 
countered in two ways. Firstly, some of the existing schemes (the European Defence 
agency and Eurocorps) have generated momentum in which participation is extended. 
Secondly, it is doubtful that a common, alternative scheme in which the possibility of free-
riding disappears altogether can be attained.  
 
The democratic nature of certain kinds of differentiated integration  
Finally, many commentators are concerned by the inter-governmental tendency inherent 
in these modalities. Although it is hard to generalise, some of these escape the 
Commission’s capacity to take initiatives, and / or the control of the European Parliament, 
and / or the jurisdictional control of the Court of Justice, and / or could even skirt control 
by member states. This is a real problem, but the scope of it should be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than prejudged as a possible generic situation.  
 
As for the pro’s, they should be viewed with this in mind: differentiated integration exists 
and seems inevitable (in one form or another) in the future. Given this fact, the following 
advantages should be considered:  
 
• Differentiated integration does not curb progress, but rather just uniform progress 
by all the member states of the EU.  
• Differentiated integration serves to accommodate the diversity and plurality of the 
member states. What is more, if its creation, probably as part of primary law, is 
handled skilfully, the EU might be able to avoid downward negotiation by offering 
escape routes to minimalists (as happened with the United Kingdom with the 
Charter). 
• In general, costs are assumed by those which are not integrated and / or those 
which are excluded (in actual practice cases of free-riding have not arisen, 
although they cannot be ruled out in areas such as defence policy).  
• Finally, from the point of view of the Trio Presidency, it must be underlined that the 
3 countries share a similar approach: Spain and Belgium participate in all existing 
modalities (with the exception of Belgium’s non-participation in the norm on 
applicable national jurisdiction for divorces) and Hungary has shown its willingness 
to take part as soon as possible in the most significant one (the euro). This means 
that they may easily share a similar approach towards these modalities and, 
eventually, they may steer any eventual prospective application. 
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